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Abstract 
 
Drawing upon an updated and expanded dataset of Energy Star and LEED labeled 
commercial offices, this paper investigates the effect of eco-labeling on rental rates, sale 
prices and occupancy rates.  Using OLS and robust regression procedures, hedonic modeling 
is used to test whether the presence of an eco-label has a significant positive effect on rental 
rates, sale prices and occupancy rates.  The study suggests that estimated coefficients can be 
sensitive to outlier treatment.    For sale prices and occupancy rates, there are notable 
differences between estimated coefficients for OLS and robust regressions.  The results 
suggest that both Energy Star and LEED offices obtain rental premiums of approximately 
3%.  A 17% sale price premium is estimated for Energy Star labeled offices but no significant 
sale price premium is estimated for LEED labeled offices.  Surprisingly, no significant 
occupancy premium is estimated for Energy Star labeled offices and a negative occupancy 
premium is estimated for LEED labeled offices. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the commercial real estate sector has seen the introduction of a wide 
range of, what can be loosely termed, environmental labels.  Environmental labels are one of 
a number of alternative and complementary policy or market-based instruments that aim to 
alter patterns of demand for products in order to reduce their environmental impact.  Within 
commercial real estate markets, a blend of compulsory and voluntary environmental labels is 
still evolving.  Indeed, as more and more local regulatory bodies make the attainment of a 
voluntary environmental label a requirement for regulatory approval, labels such as LEED are 
becoming quasi-compulsory in some jurisdictions. 
  
Given that they constitute the terms on which products are exchanged, prices are the 
fundamental instrument of markets.  It is well-established that costly information concerning 
prices and quality can affect allocational efficiency.  The central objective of environmental 
labels is to change supply and demand through the pricing mechanism.  For producers (in this 
context - real estate developers), prices act as an “invisible hand” steering production.  When 
the market price of a product is higher than its cost of production, increasing production is 
profitable, new producers have incentives to enter the market and resources are allocated to 
sectors where there is the highest willingness-to-pay.  
 
This paper investigates the extent to which the growth of environmental labelling in US office 
markets is having expected price effects in occupier and investment markets.  Building upon 
previous studies, this paper draws upon the growing sample of LEED and Energy Star 
labelled offices.  Further, the sharp deterioration in market conditions since 2007, the effects 
of the market downturn can be evaluated.  Further, this study applies robust regression  
techniques to control for potential problems created by outliers.  For sale prices and 
occupancy rates, there are notable differences between estimated coefficients for OLS and 
robust regressions.  The results suggest that both Energy Star and LEED offices obtain rental 
premiums of approximately 3%.  A 17% sale price premium is estimated for Energy Star 
labeled offices but no significant sale price premium is estimated for LEED labeled offices.  
Surprisingly, no significant occupancy premium is estimated for Energy Star labeled offices 
and a negative occupancy premium is estimated for LEED labeled offices. 
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Environmental Labelling in Context 
 
The direct aim of environmental labels is to provide information to consumers or users about 
the environmental performance of a product with the indirect aim of influencing their 
consumption choices, suppliers‟ production outputs and, as a result, the level of 
environmentally harmful emissions.  While the presence of an environmental label and 
superior environmental performance are not necessarily synonymous, environmental labels 
can be particularly important for credence products, where the costs to the consumer of 
monitoring (environmental in this instance) performance can be prohibitive both before and 
after procurement.  Due to high monitoring costs, it is common for third parties to emerge in 
order to provide independent verification.   As such, the growth of environmental labels can 
be interpreted as a method of reducing the negative externality produced by Akerlofian 
information asymmetry.  The adverse selection problem associated with information 
asymmetry can result in products with desirable credence attributes failing to be priced 
efficiently and lead to sub-optimal consumption and production.  In order to remedy potential 
market failure, environmental labels must then provide a credible signal of the attribute of 
superior environmental performance.   
 
As discussed above, the mechanism by which environmental labels can produce a net 
environmental improvement is by changes to the relative demand and supply of labelled and 
non-labelled goods.  Assuming that environmental performance is a salient attribute for 
consumers, environmental labelling enables consumers to discriminate between products 
according to their environmental impact resulting in increased demand for products with 
reduced environmental impact and in price differentials for labelled products.    Price 
premiums, in turn, provide an economic incentive for producers to innovate and incur any 
additional production costs associated with obtaining the environmental label.    
 
However, it has been argued that the introduction of environmental labels can, in certain 
plausible circumstances, produce a net increase in environmental harm.  Dosi and Moretto 
(2001) analyse this point in terms of whether environmentally labelled products act as a 
substitute or complement to conventional products.  Where there is a complementary 
relationship, the introduction of an environmental label can create image spillovers for all 
products made by a company increasing the return on capital from all products and producing 
a net increase in environmentally harmful emissions.  In contrast, where the labelled product 
acts as a substitute for conventional products, the return on conventional products remains 
stable or falls after the introduction of an environmental label with less investment in 
conventional products and improved environmental outcomes.  Dosi and Moretto (2001) also 
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point to other circumstances in which the introduction of an environmental level can cause an 
increase in aggregate emissions.  This is produced by an increase in aggregate consumption 
due to changing behaviour as a result of the „halo‟ effect of the environmental label.  
Essentially, although environmentally harmful emissions per unit decrease, this may be 
outweighed by the consumption of more units.  For instance, office occupiers may use space 
less intensively in a LEED labelled building. 
 
The interaction of demand, supply and pricing is central to Mattoo and Singh‟s (1994) 
analysis of the effect of the introduction of environmental labels on level of aggregate 
production.  They identify certain conditions in which the introduction of an environmental 
label can result in an increase in aggregate output compared to the undifferentiated market.  
They demonstrate that the introduction of the environmental label can, in some 
circumstances, result in price premiums (relative to undifferentiated price) for labelled and 
non-labelled market segments leading to an increase in overall supply.  However, relevant to 
the real estate context, such an outcome is more likely to occur where environmentally 
responsible production has a relatively large market share prior to the introduction of 
environmental labelling.   
 
Environmental Labelling in Commercial Office Markets: Expectations and Evidence 
 
There is a considerable body of commentary suggesting that buildings with superior 
environmental performance deliver a bundle of benefits to occupiers and investors.  A range 
of benefits has been attributed to buildings with superior environmental performance or 
associated with features common in buildings with superior environmental performance.  
Owners, developers and occupiers may benefit from the diverse range of incentives 
(subsidies, tax reliefs and reduced regulatory barriers) that have emerged in some markets.  
Widely cited benefits to occupiers include reduced utility costs, improved productivity (lower 
staff turnover, absenteeism, higher outputs inter alia) and reputational benefits.  Investors 
may benefit from higher occupancy rates, lower utility costs (especially in gross leases), 
decreased rates of depreciation and reduced regulatory obsolescence.  As a result of the latter 
in particular, it is also expected that buildings with superior environmental performance 
should attract a lower risk premium.  
 
The analysis above suggests that there are a number of channels through which environmental 
labels may influence the capital values of commercial offices.  In real estate pricing models 
for income generating assets, asset value represents the discounted sum all future net incomes.  
Assuming constant growth, the value (V) can be expressed as 
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where V is the current capital value, R
t 
is rental income, C
t 
is the periodic costs of owning the 
asset (management, vacancy, refurbishment etc - so that R
t
 – C
t
 = Net Operating Income), g is 
a constant growth rate, i is the target rate of return (composed of the risk-free rate of return 
plus a risk premium), and t is the life of the asset. Since freehold ownership is unlimited, this 
can be taken as a perpetuity and approximates to 
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where i – g is a capitalization rate.  So 
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As indicated above, the attributes of buildings with superior environmental performance have 
the potential to affect many of the variables in the pricing model. 
 
R
t
   Assuming a well-functioning market and that the positive attributes outweigh 
negative attributes associated with environmental labeled buildings, occupiers should 
be willing to pay higher rents due to expected lower total occupancy costs and the 
benefits to occupiers of improved image and business performance.   
 
C
t 
   It is also expected that the increased attractiveness to occupiers should reduce the 
costs of ownership due to reduced vacancies and potentially reduced capital 
expenditure.   
 
g Due to changes in relative demand, rental growth rates may be higher for assets with 
environmental labels.  In addition, depreciation rates may be lower where buildings 
have incorporated latest technologies.     
 
i   The risk premium (and, therefore, capitalization rate) may also be lower due to 
expected reduced volatility in income and decreased risk of obsolescence due to 
regulatory changes or „future proofing‟. 
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This analysis suggests that any sale price premium that investors in offices with buildings 
with environmental labels may be caused by number of factors; higher rents, higher 
occupancy rates, lower operational costs and a lower risk premium.  Given the centrality of 
the pricing mechanism to supply shifts, a key research question has been whether these 
potential benefits actually produce an increased willingness-to-pay from occupiers and 
investors.  
 
From both academic and corporate/professional bodies, there have been a large number of 
stated preference studies of occupiers‟ willingness-to-pay for buildings with superior 
environmental performance.  From the sustainability perspective, the findings have been 
almost overwhelmingly positive. However, there have been only a small number of studies 
based on revealed preferences.  Due to data availability, a group of studies have drawn upon 
the CoStar database to estimate the effect of environmental labelling on sale and rental rates.  
It is notable that all studies focus on the office sector due to the much higher market 
penetration of environmental labels in this sector relative to retail and industrial properties.  
Before going on to review these studies, it is important to point out that environmental 
labeling of offices has been a relatively recent phenomenon.    Whilst growth rates have been 
rapid, they have been from a negligible base.  Fuerst (2009) points out that in the first half of 
the decade the largest producers of environmental labeled buildings were government and 
corporate organizations.  However, in the last few years, commercial developers have 
accounted for a greater proportion of schemes.  Although researchers can only analyze the 
data that is available to them, existing studies have been based on small samples drawn from a 
relatively short timeframe.    
 
Whilst econometric procedures are used by all studies to estimate the price effect of LEED 
and Energy Star labels, all studies vary in terms of their model specification, choice of 
explanatory variables, sample and, not surprisingly, results.  To control for differences 
between their sample of environmental labeled buildings (927 buildings) and a much larger 
sample of non-labeled buildings, Miller, Spivey and Florance (2008) included a number of 
control variables such as size, location and age in their hedonic regression framework. They 
found that no statistically significant rent premium for Energy Star and LEED labeled offices.  
Using the same data source, Miller et al (2008) reported respective sale price premiums of 
approximately 6% and 11% for Energy Star and LEED labeled offices.   
 
Wiley, Benefield and Johnson (WBJ) (forthcoming) focused on the effect of LEED and 
Energy Star labelling on rent, occupancy rate and sale price for Class A buildings in 46 office 
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markets across the USA.  Using an hedonic procedure, they estimated asking rental premia 
ranging from approximately 15-18% for LEED labeled offices and 7-9% for Energy Star 
labelled buildings.  In terms of sales transactions, they estimated premia of $130 per sq ft for 
LEED labelled buildings and $30 for Energy Star.  In addition, they estimated occupancy rate 
premia of 16-18% for LEED offices and 10-11% for Energy Star offices.  However, these 
findings of large premia need to be treated with some caution.  A key issue is in the WBJ 
paper is the control for location.  In essence, they identify rental, sale and occupancy premia 
for environmental labelled offices relative to non-labeled offices in the same metropolitan 
area.  However, if environmental labelled offices tend to be in better quality locations within 
a metropolitan area, observed premia may include a location as well as a environmental 
labelling premium.   In terms of the sample, WBJ (forthcoming) do not state explicitly the 
period of the sample nor the numbers of Energy Star and LEED labelled buildings included in 
the study.  From their summary statistics, it is possible to infer that the sample for LEED was 
extremely small - for LEED and Energy Star we estimate that the respective sample sizes 
were approximately 30 and 440 (rents) and 12 and 70 (sales).     
 
Fuerst and McAllister (forthcoming) estimated the hedonic rental regression for a sample of 
197 LEED and 834 Energy Star as well as over 15,000 benchmark buildings.  The results 
suggested that environmental labeled offices have an average asking rental premium of 4-5% 
with a LEED labeled offices having a slightly higher premium than Energy Star.  
Furthermore, based on a sample of sale prices for 559 Energy Star and 127 LEED labeled 
offices, they found substantial price premia of 26% and 25% respectively with higher ratings 
e.g. Silver, Gold, Platinum achieving higher premia.  The same authors (2009), using OLS 
and quantile regression analyses, found a significant positive relationship between occupancy 
rate and the LEED and Energy Star eco-label.  Controlling for differences in age, height, 
building class and quality, their results suggested that occupancy rates are approximately 8% 
higher in LEED labeled offices and 3% higher in Energy Star labeled offices.  However, for 
Energy Star labeled offices effects were concentrated in certain market segments (see Fuerst 
and McAllister 2009).    
 
The best-known empirical study of the price effects of environmental labeling is by Eichholtz, 
Kok and Quigley (EKQ) (forthcoming). They also use an hedonic procedure to investigate the 
effect of the LEED and Energy Star labels on the current asking rents of 694 and sale prices 
of 199 environmentally labeled office buildings sold in the period 2004 to 2007.  Using GIS 
techniques, they control for location effects by identifying other office buildings in the CoStar 
database within a radius of 0.2 miles of each labeled building. The authors identify a 
statistically significant rent premium on the asking rents per square foot of 3.3% for Energy 
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Star labeled buildings.  Surprisingly, they find no significant rent premium for LEED labeled 
buildings.  They also report similar results for 199 sales that took place between 2004 and 
2007.  They find a substantial 19% sale price premium for Energy Star labeled buildings but 
no statistically significant sale price premium for LEED labeled buildings.  However, EKQ 
(forthcoming) provide no breakdown of the numbers of LEED and Energy Star buildings 
included in their sample.  Since previous studies suggest that the LEED labeled buildings are 
unlikely to account for more than 20% of all environmental labeled buildings, this suggests 
that the study is based upon approximately 150 LEED offices and 550 Energy Star offices 
(rents) and 40 LEED offices and 160 Energy Star offices (sales).    
 
Two other papers have focused on different aspects of financial performance. Dermisi‟s 
(2009) study also examines the effect of differences within LEED rating on the appraised 
values of 351 LEED labeled office buildings in the US.  More pertinent to this paper, drawing 
upon the NCREIF database, Pivo and Fisher (2009) include environmental labeled properties 
in a broader sample of “RPI properties” that use proximity to transit stations (669 properties), 
Energy Star (209 properties) and/or inclusion in a designated regeneration area as criteria 
(158 properties).  Using hedonic procedures, they estimate a 12.5% premium on appraised 
capital value and a 3.3% Net Operating Income premium for Energy Star labeled buildings.  
They also estimated that utility costs were approximately 10% lower for Energy Star 
buildings.  However, although statistically significant, they found a small occupancy rate 
premium of 1%.   
 
Data  
 
This study is also based upon the LEED and Energy Star environmental labels for commercial 
buildings in the US.  The Energy Star program tends to be more commonly used for existing 
buildings and is an assessment of buildings‟ energy performance.  Energy Star accreditation 
reflects relative energy efficiency and environmental performance since only buildings that 
are in the top quartile are eligible for Energy Star accreditation.  LEED accreditation relies 
upon scores in a number of different categories focused on; location, water efficiency, energy 
and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation and 
design process.  The LEED thresholds are primarily absolute. All buildings that reach the 
required levels can be certified.  There are four levels of certification; certified, silver, gold 
and platinum. LEED certification is comparable to other real estate environmental labelling 
schemes in the UK, Germany and Australia and is likely to provide the framework for 
prospective harmonized global standards.     
 
Exhibit 1                    Summary Statistics 
OVERALL Age Age at sale  Rent $ psf Size sq ft Stories Sale price psf  Occupancy rate (%) 
 Mean 32 28 19.94 66511 4 181.65 71.35 
 Median 26 22 18.00 24000 2 150.51 82.64 
 Maximum 256 253 271.90 3781045 110 1384.19 100.00 
 Minimum 0 0 1.00 0 0 0.05 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 28 26 8.90 133681 6 135.14 31.49 
         
 Observations 39,391 19,498 40,492 44,489 44,151 14,048 44,484 
        
Energy Star Age Age at sale  Rent $ psf Size sq ft Stories Sale price psf  Occupancy rate (%) 
 Mean 25 20 26.10 289,989 13 273.53 86.9 
 Median 23 19 23.93 201,028 9 239.28 90.4 
 Maximum 135 125 271.90 2,650,000 82 859.78 100.0 
 Minimum 0 0 5.50 3,255 1 23.04 0.0 
 Std. Dev. 17 16 11.68 284,715 12 143.00 14.4 
        
 Observations 2,375 1,693 2,082 2,379 2,378 939 2,379 
        
LEED Age Age at sale  Rent $ psf Size sq ft Stories Sale price psf  Occupancy rate (%) 
 Mean 20 22 27.03 259,088 10 271.73 72.82 
 Median 8 17 24.49 156,040 5 237.21 88.45 
 Maximum 124 107 94.03 3,448,680 58 859.78 100.00 
 Minimum 0 0 8.00 1,775 1 32.07 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 26 25 10.95 345,671 12 157.68 33.60 
        
 Observations 387 209 317 397 397 147 397 
        
The study draws on CoStar's comprehensive national commercial real estate database which 
includes approximately 43 billion square feet of commercial space in two million properties 
making it the largest available real estate database in the United States.  In the first step, we 
drew details of approximately 2776 environmentally labeled offices of which 397 were LEED 
labeled and 2,379 were Energy Star. Of the LEED buildings, In the second step, buildings 
were selected in the same metropolitan areas and submarket as the labeled sample. Sample 
selection was based on the criteria a) same submarket or market as labeled buildings and b) at 
least 10 comparable observations for each labeled building in the database. In total, we have 
used 14,048 observations of transaction prices and 40,492 rent observations.  While 
transaction prices are considered over a period of 11 years from 1999 through end of 2009 to 
obtain a sufficiently large sample, all rent observations are as of Q4 2009.   
 
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Exhibit 1.  There are clearly some differences 
between environmental labeled  and non-labeled office buildings.  The former tend to be 
newer.  In particular, the median age of LEED labeled offices is eight years.  The comparable 
figure for the benchmark sample is 26.  While there is relatively little difference between 
buildings with Energy Star label and the benchmark sample in terms of age, the former tend 
to be dominated by tall buildings suggesting that they are mainly located in CBD locations.  
This is supported by the fact that Energy Star buildings tend to be much larger than non-
labeled buildings.  Without controlling for the differences between the samples, median rental 
rates are approximately 35% higher in LEED and Energy Star labeled buildings.  
Environmental labeled offices buildings also tend to have lower vacancy rates than non-
labeled buildings.  However, compared to previous studies the gap between the control 
sample and the labeled buildings seems to have narrowed.  For instance, Fuerst and 
McAllister (2009) found that the median occupancy rate for a multi-tenanted LEED labeled 
offices was 99%.  In this sample, the comparable figure is 88%.  A similar change is found for 
Energy Star labeled buildings.  Indeed, there seems to have been a convergence between 
Energy Star and LEED buildings.  Compared to previous research, in this sample LEED and 
Energy Star labeled buildings have notably similar rents and sale prices.  Compared to the 
buildings in the control sample, they are much more similar in terms of size and height. 
 
Since the results of regression procedures can be sensitive to outliers caused by faulty data, it 
is important to be transparent about the treatment of outliers or data errors in the study.  
Similar to EKQ (forthcoming), we also find that there were some discrepancies between the 
properties identified as certified by CoStar and details of the properties listed by US Green 
Building Council.  When this occurred, corrections have been made.  However, a number of 
additional problems emerged when analyzing the CoStar data.    At the top end of the price 
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distribution, due to their relatively small number it was relatively straightforward to identify 
data errors and remove them from the sample.  These anomalies were typically due to 
portfolio sale prices used as the basis for calculating the price per square foot of an individual 
asset within that portfolio.  However, apparent data anomalies at the lower end of the price 
scale were more numerous.  Put simply, there was a large number of sales prices that seemed 
to be unrealistic.  Preliminary investigation suggested that these data errors were due to sales 
of a part of a building being recorded as representing the sale of the whole building, non-arms 
length transactions and portfolio sales (price of building psf being calculated as price of 
building divided by size of portfolio).   
 
The potential implications of such data errors are not trivial.  Given samples of thousands of 
transactions, investigating the reliability and provenance of each individual transaction can be 
extremely time-consuming.  Nevertheless, the outputs from our OLS models were extremely 
sensitive to the choice of trimming criteria used to try to exclude potential data errors.   
Furthermore, a clear relationship was found.  The lower the „cut-off‟ used to exclude potential 
data errors, the larger the premium estimated for environmental labeled buildings.  For 
instance, when all sale prices below $30 psf. are trimmed, we estimate an 18% sale price 
premium for Energy Star labeled office buildings and no statistically significant sale price 
premium for LEED labeled office buildings.  The corresponding figures when the cut-off is 
$5 psf. are 27% and 20% respectively.  In order to control for potential bias due to outliers, 
robust regressions are also used to model the determinants of rental and sale prices and 
occupancy rates.  
Robust regression as implemented in the STATA package uses Huber and Tukey biweights to 
mitigate the impact of outliers on regressions coefficients in the estimation (Huber, 1964 and 
Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987).  Outliers are identified using Cook's distance which measures 
the effect of deleting a given observation based on each observation's residual in the 
regression and its leverage in the estimation process.  All observations with Cook's distances 
larger than 1, automatically obtain a zero weight in the estimation.  Verardi and Croux (2009) 
describe the highly efficient M-estimator computed by robust regression, in particular the 
Tukey Biweight function as.   
 
The iterative algorithm starts off with a Huber (p) function with the following specification:  
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Although this method of estimating robust regressions has been criticized for not completely 
controlling all bad leverage observations and potential clusters of outliers (see for example 
Rousseeuw and Van Zomeren, 1990), it provides a sufficiently robust estimation in the 
framework of this analysis which is not plagued by extreme outliers which may occur in other 
types of analyses.  
 
Hedonic regression modeling is the standard methodology for examining price determinants 
in real estate research. We use this method in our study primarily to isolate the effect of 
LEED and Energy Star certification. As described in the literature review section of this 
paper, higher mean rents or transaction prices may simply be due to the fact that certified 
buildings are newer, higher or located in more attractive locations or markets.  The 
quintessential log-linear hedonic rent model takes the following form:  
 
iiiii ZxRln         (2) 
 
Where Ri is the natural log of average rent per square foot in a given building, xi is a vector of 
the natural log of several explanatory locational and physical characteristics,  β  and φ are the 
respective vectors of parameters to be estimated. Zi is a vector of time-related variables and i  
is a random error and stochastic disturbance term that is expected to take the form of a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of e
2
. The hedonic weights assigned to each 
variable are equivalent to this characteristic‟s overall contribution to the rental price (Rosen 
1974). For the purpose of this study, we specify two types of hedonic models. The first type 
explains rents, the second explains price per square foot in sales transactions and the third 
explains occupancy rates.  
 
To capture the effects of environmental labels on rental and sale prices, we use dummy 
variables to indicate whether a building has an Energy Star or LEED label.  A positive co-
efficient is expected and would indicate that, on average, environmental labeled offices rent 
or sell for more than non-labelled offices.  In addition to mitigating the effects of extreme 
values, the log-linear specification of the hedonic model allows us to interpret the coefficients 
in terms of average percentage premiums. The complete specification of the log –linear model 
is as follows 
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Where: 
LNRENTi  represents the natural log of asking rent per square foot. 
C0 is a constant term 
ES  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has an Energy Star label. 
LEED  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a LEED label. 
AGEBAND represents the band (see Appendix 1) in which the property lies measured from the year of 
construction or the year of a major refurbishment (whichever occurred more recently).  The 
omitted category is Band 1 – properties less than three years old. 
OCCUPANCY represents the percentage of building that is occupied. 
LNSTOREYS  is the natural logarithm of number of stories of the property. 
LNSIZE   represents the natural logarithm of rental building area. 
LNLAND  represents the natural logarithm of the plot size. 
NET  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is let on net lease. 
GROSS  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is let on gross lease. 
CLASSA  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is categorized as Class A. 
CLASSB  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is categorized as Class B. 
SINGLETENANT  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a single tenant. 
AIRCON is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has air-conditioning. 
ATRIUM is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has an atrium. 
BANK is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a bank branch. 
COMRAIL is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is within 800m of a rail terminus. 
CORNER is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is located on a corner plot. 
DRYCLEAN is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a dry cleaning facility in the building. 
FITNESS is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a gym in the building 
ONSITEMAN is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has an onsite manager. 
RESTAURANT  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a restaurant in the building. 
 SIGNAGE  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a sign.  
PARKING  is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has parking. 
SUBWAY is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is within 800m of a subway station. 
SUBMARKETi   a binary variable indicating in which of the T submarkets that the property is located in 
εi  is the error term which is assumed to be independent across observations and normally 
distributed with constant variance and a mean of zero.  
 
Similarly, the regression for estimating price per square foot in sales transactions is estimated 
in the same way with many common independent variables:  
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A number of additional variables are used in the sale transaction model to control for time 
varying financial and macro-economic conditions: 
 
LNSALEPRICEi represents the natural log of sale price per square foot in real terms. 
3MTBILL represents the three month Treasury bill rate. 
YIELDCURVE represents the difference between the 10 year and three month Treasury bill rate. 
DEFAULTRISK represents the Baa corporate bond yield less the AAA corporate bond yield. 
MITTBI represents the total return on office property for the MIT transaction-based real estate index.
   
 
Our expectations are generally similar according to the whether rents or sale prices are being 
modeled.  However, with age whilst we expect a negative relation for rents, a quadratic 
relationship has frequently been observed between price and age (Ling and Petrova, 2008).  
The estimated coefficients for the various amenities (parking, bank, gym etc), size and 
number of storeys are expected to be positive in both models.     The variable Class A or B 
controls for building quality.  We expect lower rents for offices let on leases on terms other 
than triple. Buildings that are unclassified are used as the control group.  We also include a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a building is occupied by a single tenant.  For the sale 
price model, we control for variations in market conditions at the time of sale by including a  
 
Exhibit 2                   Rental rates 
OLS Regression Robust Regression 
 Coefficient  Coefficient 
C0 2.38 *** C0 2.75 *** 
ES  0.03 *** ES  0.03 *** 
LEED  0.03  LEED  0.03 ** 
AGEBAND2 -0.14 *** AGEBAND2 -0.13 *** 
AGEBAND3 -0.17 *** AGEBAND3 -0.15 *** 
AGEBAND4 -0.22 *** AGEBAND4 -0.20 *** 
AGEBAND5 -0.24 *** AGEBAND5 -0.22 *** 
AGEBAND6 -0.25 *** AGEBAND6 -0.24 *** 
AGEBAND7 -0.26 *** AGEBAND7 -0.24 *** 
AGEBAND8 -0.25 *** AGEBAND8 -0.24 *** 
AGEBAND9 -0.24 *** AGEBAND9 -0.23 *** 
AGEBAND10 -0.23 *** AGEBAND10 -0.21 *** 
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OCCUPANCY 0.00 *** OCCUPANCY 0.00 *** 
LNSTOREYS 0.06 *** LNSTOREYS 0.05 *** 
LNSIZE  0.00  LNSIZE  0.00 * 
LNLAND 0.01 ** LNLAND 0.00 ** 
NETi  -0.10 *** NETi  -0.10 *** 
GROSS  0.04 *** GROSS  0.05 *** 
CLASSA  0.17 *** CLASSA  0.18 *** 
CLASSB  0.08 *** CLASSB  0.09 *** 
SINGLETENANT  0.01  SINGLETENANT  0.01 * 
ATRIUM 0.02 ** ATRIUM 0.01 ** 
BANK 0.02 *** BANK 0.02 *** 
COMRAIL 0.05 ** COMRAIL 0.05 *** 
CORNER 0.00  CORNER 0.00  
DRYCLEAN -0.01  DRYCLEAN 0.01  
FITNESS 0.02 ** FITNESS 0.01 ** 
FOODSERVICE 0.00  FOODSERVICE 0.00  
ONSITEMAN 0.00  ONSITEMAN 0.00  
RESTAURANT 0.00  RESTAURANT 0.00  
 SIGNAGE  0.00   SIGNAGE  0.00  
PARKING  0.02  PARKING  0.02  
SUBWAY 0.02  SUBWAY 0.02  
SUBMARKET 
CONTROLS 
  SUBMARKET 
CONTROLS 
  
      
Adj R-squared 0.59  Adj R-squared n/a  
F-test 71.98  F-test 105.24  
F-test prob 0.00  F-test prob 0.00  
N 22273  N 22273  
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number of factors used to model real estate capitalization rates and capital values.  Sub-
market dummies are used to control for location effects.  
 
Empirical Results 
 
Rental rates 
 
Exhibit 2 presents the empirical results for the OLS and robust regressions for the rental rates.  
The results reveal that the estimated coefficients on the variables are of the predicted sign in 
most cases.    For example, the estimated coefficient on age is negative and statistically 
significant.  Relative to office buildings less than three years old, rental rates tend to fall 
quickly in the following fifteen years and then stabilize for buildings over 20 years old.  As 
expected, the estimated co-efficient on Class A is positive.  Additionally, the estimated 
coefficient for leasing on net lease terms is also negative and the coefficient for a gross lease 
is significantly positive.   
 
The estimated coefficients for the OLS and robust regressions are consistent.  This suggests 
that outliers due to data errors are not as significant for rental rates.    The most notable 
difference is that the estimated coefficient for a LEED label becomes significant at the 5% 
level in the robust regression.  The estimated coefficients for rental rates for Energy Star and 
LEED labels are in line with previous studies.  The estimated coefficients for the presence of 
amenities are variable.  Not surprisingly, no amenities have a significantly negative effect on 
rental rates.  Properties that have fitness centers and banking facilities tend to have higher 
rents.  Various accessibility factors such as proximity to a rail terminus and a subway station 
or the presence of parking facilities also have a positive effect on rental rates.   
 
Sale prices 
 
Exhibit 3 presents the empirical results for the OLS and robust regressions for the sale prices. 
It reveals that the estimated coefficients on the variables are of the predicted sign in most 
cases.  However, for sale prices, the results indicate that data errors may be a significant 
problem. Crucially in the context of this paper, the results of both regressions are not 
consistent in terms of the estimated coefficients for LEED and Energy Star premiums.  The 
OLS model (without trimming) estimates extremely large sale price premiums for both LEED 
(23%) and Energy Star (305). For the robust regression results, although positive, the 
estimated coefficient for the LEED dummy is not significant.  However, although it is lower, 
the estimated sale price premium for the Energy Star label is 15% and is statistically  
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Exhibit 3                               Sale Prices 
OLS Regression Robust Regression 
 Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant 6.00 *** Constant 5.00 *** 
ES  0.30 *** ES  0.17 *** 
LEED  0.23 *** LEED  0.05  
AGEBAND2 0.25 *** AGEBAND2 0.11 *** 
AGEBAND3 0.27 *** AGEBAND3 0.03  
AGEBAND4 0.17 *** AGEBAND4 -0.07 *** 
AGEBAND5 0.11 *** AGEBAND5 -0.13 *** 
AGEBAND6 0.08 ** AGEBAND6 -0.18 *** 
AGEBAND7 0.09 *** AGEBAND7 -0.17 *** 
AGEBAND8 0.06 ** AGEBAND8 -0.19 *** 
AGEBAND9 0.03  AGEBAND9 -0.20 ** 
AGEBAND10 0.05  AGEBAND10 -0.19 *** 
OCCUPANCY -0.001 * OCCUPANCY -0.001  
LNSTOREYS 0.08 *** LNSTOREYS 0.07 *** 
LNSIZE  0.27 *** LNSIZE  -0.20 *** 
LNLAND 0.13 *** LNLAND 0.13 *** 
NET 0.01  NET 0.03 * 
GROSS  0.03  GROSS  -0.03 * 
CLASSA  0.38 *** CLASSA  0.31 *** 
CLASSB  0.08 *** CLASSB  0.07 *** 
SINGLETENANT  0.15 *** SINGLETENANT  0.08 *** 
BANK1 0.07 ** BANK 0.07 *** 
FITNESS 0.12 *** FITNESS 0.08 *** 
FOODSERVICE 0.05 * FOODSERVICE 0.02  
ONSITEMAN 0.11 *** ONSITEMAN 0.05 *** 
RESTAURANT 0.09 *** RESTAURANT 0.08 *** 
SUBWAY 0.14 ** SUBWAY 0.10 ** 
3MTBILL 0.02  3MTBILL 0.01  
10YRGBOND 0.01  10YRGBOND 0.01  
DEFAULTRISK -0.11 *** DEFAULTRISK 0.00  
MITTBI 0.01 *** MITTBI 0.00 *** 
LNEMPGROWTH -0.42 ** LNEMPGROWTH -0.62 *** 
SOLD 2000 0.02  SOLD 2000 0.04  
SOLD 2001 0.08  SOLD 2001 0.10 *** 
SOLD 2002 0.18 *** SOLD 2002 0.13 *** 
SOLD 2003 0.13  SOLD 2003 0.14 *** 
SOLD 2004 0.14 * SOLD 2004 0.19 *** 
SOLD 2005 0.15 * SOLD 2005 0.27 *** 
SOLD 2006 0.00  SOLD 2006 0.24 *** 
SOLD 2007 -0.22  SOLD 2007 0.20 ** 
SOLD 2008 -0.28 * SOLD 2008 0.17 * 
SOLD 2009 -0.61 *** SOLD 2009 -0.02  
SUBMARKET CONTROLS   SUBMARKET CONTROLS   
      
Adj R-squared 0.37  Adj R-squared N/A  
F-test 13.23  F-test 25.37  
F-test prob 0.00  F-test prob 0.00  
N 9672  N 9672  
                                               
1
 Estimated coefficients for signage, parking, atrium, drycleaner, corner site and commuter rail 
terminus were not significant.  They are not reported here for the sake of brevity. 
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significant.  This is consistent with our observation that, when using a simple trimming 
procedure, the estimated coefficients for LEED and Energy Star reduced substantially when 
(unrealistically) low value sales prices were trimmed.  
 
The results for age and year dummies suggest that the robust regression provides more 
plausible and reliable estimates.  For example, consistent with a quadratic relationship the 
estimated coefficients on age are initially positive, become negative as buildings age and 
stabilize after 220-25 years.  In the OLS regression, less plausibly no negative capital 
depreciation relative to newer offices is ever estimated.  Similarly, the effect of Year Sold 
also seems more plausible in the robust regression.   For most of the other variables, the OLS 
and robust regression provide similar estimates.  As expected, the estimated co-efficient on 
Class A is positive.  Additionally, the estimated coefficient for leasing on net lease terms is 
positive with the coefficient for a gross lease being significantly negative at the 10% level.  
The estimated coefficients for the presence of amenities are variable.  Not surprisingly, no 
amenities have a significantly negative effect on rental rates.  Properties that have fitness 
centers and banking facilities tend to have higher rents.  Various accessibility factors such as 
proximity to a rail terminus and a subway station or the presence of parking facilities also 
have a positive effect on sale prices.  
 
Occupancy Rates 
 
Exhibit 4 presents the empirical results for the OLS and robust regressions for the sale prices. 
When controlling for the rent determinants such as building class, age, height, size and sub-
market location, we do not find evidence that environmental labeled office buildings have 
higher occupancy rates. In the OLS model, there is a statistically significant positive 
coefficient for the Energy Star indicating an occupancy rate premium of approximately 2%.    
Surprisingly, the LEED dummy is significantly negative.  The estimated coefficient from the 
OLS model suggests a 7% lower occupancy rate for LEED labeled offices.  For Energy Star 
offices, this finding is consistent with previous research by Miller et al (2008), Pivo and 
Fisher (2009) and Fuerst and McAllister (2009).   However, no other study has reported a 
significantly negative coefficient for LEED rating on occupancy rates.  When, a robust 
regression procedure is used, the Energy Star premium disappears and the negative estimate 
for LEED is reduced but remains significant at the 5% level.  This result is difficult to explain 
and requires further investigation.  Prima facie, it suggests that LEED labeled offices have 
performed below average in terms of occupancy rates during the downturn.  
 
 20 
 
Exhibit 4                Occupancy Rates 
OLS Regression Robust Regression 
 Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant -59.63 *** Constant -26.36 *** 
ES  1.84 ** ES  0.52  
LEED  -6.95 *** LEED  -3.13 ** 
AGEBAND2 20.90 *** AGEBAND2 18.25 *** 
AGEBAND3 17.15 *** AGEBAND3 16.55 *** 
AGEBAND4 16.32 *** AGEBAND4 15.19 *** 
AGEBAND5 15.56 *** AGEBAND5 14.84 *** 
AGEBAND6 15.42 *** AGEBAND6 15.46 *** 
AGEBAND7 15.44 *** AGEBAND7 15.63 *** 
AGEBAND8 12.53 *** AGEBAND8 14.00 *** 
AGEBAND9 11.40 *** AGEBAND9 13.24 *** 
AGEBAND10 11.14 *** AGEBAND10 13.55 *** 
LNSTOREYS 0.00  LNSTOREYS -1.65 *** 
LNSIZE  8.77 *** LNSIZE  7.01 *** 
LNLAND -1.63 *** LNLAND -1.19 *** 
NET -10.21 *** NET -7.89 *** 
GROSS  -3.08 *** GROSS  -4.26 *** 
CLASSA  -7.89 *** CLASSA  -5.03 *** 
CLASSB  -2.06 *** CLASSB  -2.42 *** 
LNRENT 6.54 *** LNRENT 6.75 *** 
ATRIUM -0.59  ATRIUM -1.07 * 
BANK 0.44  BANK 0.03  
COMRAIL -3.40 * COMRAIL 0.91 * 
CORNER 0.01  CORNER -0.28  
DRYCLEAN 0.14  DRYCLEAN -0.39  
FITNESS -1.08  FITNESS -1.08  
FOODSERVICE -4.36 *** FOODSERVICE -3.08 *** 
ONSITEMAN 0.87 * ONSITEMAN -0.18  
RESTAURANT -0.24  RESTAURANT -0.67  
 SIGNAGE  1.56 ***  SIGNAGE  0.23  
PARKING  -2.75  PARKING  0.90  
SUBWAY -1.54  SUBWAY 1.44  
SUBMARKET   SUBMARKET   
CONTROLS   CONTROLS   
      
Adj R-squared 0.25  Adj R-squared n/a  
F-test 16.87  F-test 33.45  
F-test prob 0.00  F-test prob 0.00  
N 22273  N 22273  
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The results for the other variables are in line with expectations.  In line with previous research 
on price premiums in LEED and Energy Star offices and in other studies of office rental 
determination, occupancy levels (similar to rent levels) display a positive relationship with 
size.  Compared to recently constructed offices (aged 0-3 years), occupancy rates of offices 
are higher for buildings all building types.  This is presumably due to the numbers of 
relatively new buildings in the first age band which are still in the leasing up phase.  
However, the lack of a significantly different occupancy rate linked to building quality is 
notable and consistent with previous studies.  The low explanatory power of the model is a 
concern and suggests that important variables may have been omitted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central aim of the policy of environmental or energy labelling real estate assets is to 
reduce their environmental impact by altering patterns of demand and supply.  It is hoped 
that by providing independently verified information to investors and occupiers about the 
environmental/energy performance of buildings, their willingness-to-pay for buildings 
with superior environmental performance will increase.  Consequently, this shift in 
demand from investors and occupiers will produce rental and sale price premiums and 
reduce operating costs and regulatory obsolescence.  Suppliers of buildings (investors and 
developers) will have financial incentives to improve their environmental/energy 
performance.  Pricing studies are central to evaluating the effectiveness of  environmental 
labeling in real estate markets.   
 
Drawing upon much larger samples of rental and sale prices compared to previous 
research, the contribution of this study has been twofold.  Firstly, it indicates that, for sale 
prices in particular, outliers have the potential to produce overestimation of sale price 
premiums.  In particular, the estimated coefficients for environmental labeled offices for 
sale prices are sensitive to choice of trimming parameters.  Relative to OLS regression 
procedures, robust regression procedures estimate much lower sale price premiums for 
LEED and Energy Star environmental labels.  Although a substantial sale price premium 
is found for Energy Star labeled buildings, in the robust regression model, no significant 
sales price premium is identified for the LEED label.    Whilst these results are in line 
with Eichholtz at al (forthcoming), this finding seems surprising given the prominence of 
the LEED label.  For rental rates, the results are consistent with previous studies that find 
a premium of 1%-3%.    Most surprisingly, the estimated coefficients for occupancy rates 
indicate no significant occupancy rate premium for the Energy Star label and a negative 
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effect on occupancy rates of the LEED label.  This finding, in particular, needs further 
detailed checking.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Age Bands 
 
Band Age (years) 
1 < 3 
2 [3, 9) 
3 [9, 15) 
4 [15, 19) 
5 [19, 22) 
6 [22, 24) 
7 [24, 29) 
8 [29, 38) 
9 [38, 71) 
10 >= 71 
  
 
